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The Eurozone banking and sovereign debt crisis has brought the fragility of the European 
monetary union into sharp focus and exposed the lack of effective instruments at the 
European level to maintain financial stability. As a response to the crisis, the Member 
States and the institutions of the Union adopted in short succession several financial 
assistance measures that have given rise to much political and legal controversy.
1
 The 
European Central Bank (ECB) played an active role in the institutions’ efforts to contain the 
crisis and prevent the disintegration of the Eurozone by deploying a number of so-called 
non-standard or unconventional monetary policy measures, namely its Securities Markets 
Programme, Long-Term Refinancing Operations, and in September 2012 the Outright 
Monetary Transactions Programme (OMT Programme).
2
 The OMT Decision envisages 
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1 The most important rescue measures were: Council Regulation 407/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 118/1) (EC) (establishing a 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)); European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), EFSF Framework 
Agreement  (2010) (establishing the EFSF on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement of the Eurozone 
Member States on May 9, 2010); Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), Feb. 2, 2012, 2011 
O.J. (L 91) 1 - The rescue measures have been the subject of a number of legal challenges, see, e.g., Case C-370/12 
Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, Judgment of 27 November 2012, 
n.y.r.; and the decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court: Bundesverfassungsgericht  [BVerfG - Federal 
Constitutional Court] Case No. 2 BvR 1099/10, 126 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 158 
(June 9, 2010), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/index.html; 129 BVERFGE 124 (ESF); 130 BVERFGE 318 
(StabMechG); BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12 (Sep. 12, 2012), 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/index.html (ESM Judgment). 
2 See Press Release, ECB, Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions (Sep. 6, 2012), 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html, for a press release that sets out the 
OMT Decision of the Governing Council of the ECB. 
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unlimited purchases by the ECB of specific types of sovereign bonds
3
 issued by Member 
States participating in an EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary program 
in the secondary market. Without the program having been activated, i.e. without the ECB 
actually implementing the decision and without any purchases of government bonds, 
yields on bonds of the affected Eurozone countries decreased markedly after the 
announcement of the OMT Decision. The OMT Programme has accordingly been credited 
with having been instrumental in restoring financial stability and preventing a breakup of 





Notwithstanding the economic success of the OMT Programme, a number of private 
citizens and a German political party brought legal actions before the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (Constitutional Court). In their constitutional complaints, the 
claimants challenge the rescue measures adopted by the Member States, the ECB, and the 
other relevant European institutions during the Euro crisis, and in particular the OMT 
Decision, on various grounds. The claimants argue inter alia that (future) purchases of 
government bonds on the basis of the OMT Decision would constitute illegal monetary 
financing; that the German Federal Government is under an obligation to work towards a 
repeal of the OMT Decision, including by bringing proceedings for annulment of the ECB’s 
actions before the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ); that German constitutional 
organs “must refrain from all acts or decisions which serve to implement [the OMT] 
Decision”; and that the German Bundestag fails to exercise its overall budgetary 
responsibility by not withholding consent to ESM-related measures. 
 
In its ruling, the Constitutional Court expresses serious concerns about the legality of the 
ECB’s actions envisaged in its OMT Decision.
5
 The Constitutional Court does not, however, 
reach a final decision on the matter, but has made for the first time in its history a 
reference to the ECJ pursuant to Article 267 TFEU. The referral follows the procedure set 
out by the Constitutional Court in its Honeywell and Lisbon decisions.
6
 Honeywell, in 
particular, has been interpreted as an example of judicial self-restraint on the part of the 
Constitutional Court fostering a cooperative relationship between the German Court and 
the ECJ in the spirit of the German constitution’s “openness towards European Law 
                                            
3 i.e. sovereign bonds with a maturity of one to three years at the time of purchase; id. 
4 INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: RESTORING CONFIDENCE AND PROGRESSING ON REFORMS 4 
(2012); GUILLERMO DE LA DEHESA, NON-STANDARD AND UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY MEASURES (2013), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201309/20130920ATT71694/20130920ATT71694EN.p
df. 
5 BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/index.html 
[hereinafter OMT Ruling]. 
6 BVerfGE 126, 286, Decision of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06 (Honeywell); BVerfGE 123, 267, Judgment of 30 June 
2009, 2 BvE 2/08 (Lisbon). 
2014] Law Meets Economics 283 
             
(Europarechtsfreundlichkeit)”.
7
 In the two decisions, the Constitutional Court reiterated 
that, while it accepts in principle the primacy of EU law, it reserves the right to review acts 
of the EU institutions for being ultra vires (ultra vires review) or affecting the constitutional 
identity of Germany (identity review). However, such a review will “only be exercised in a 
manner which is friendly towards European law.”
8
 This means for the ultra vires review 
that the ECJ must first be given the opportunity to interpret the Treaty and rule on the 
validity of the challenged act and that the Constitutional Court will only exercise its powers 
of review “if it is manifest that acts of European institutions and agencies have taken place 
outside the transferred powers.”
9
 A breach of the principle of conferral is manifest if it is 
“sufficiently qualified”, which is defined by the Constitutional Court as a transgression that 
is “evident”
10
 and “highly significant for the allocation of powers between the Member 
States and the Union.”
11
 As far as identity review is concerned, the Constitutional Court will 
declare acts of the EU institutions as inapplicable in Germany if they interfere with “the 
inviolable core content of [Germany’s] constitutional identity.”
12
 In its ESM Judgment, the 
Constitutional Court previously held that identity review might be triggered where the 
federal parliament’s budgetary autonomy was compromised because of supranational 




In its OMT Ruling, the Constitutional Court has now, to widespread surprise, activated this 
review procedure and, as a first step, referred the following questions to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling: 
 
(a) Whether the OMT Decision is incompatible with Articles 119 and 127 TFEU as well 
as the ECB’s Statute, because it constitutes an overstepping by the ECB of its 
monetary policy mandate, and because it infringes the powers of the Member 
                                            
7 See, e.g., Honeywell, id. para. 225. For an analysis of the relationship between the Constitutional Court and the 
Court of Justice of the EU in light of Honeywell see Gertrude Luebbe-Wolff, Who Has the Last Word? National and 
Transnational Courts—Conflict and Cooperation, 30 YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 1, 4 (2011). 
8 Honeywell, id. para 58. 
9 Id. at paras. 60-61. 
10 In German: “offensichtlich”, see id. at para. 61. 
11 Id. 
12 Lisbon Judgment, supra note 6, para. 240. Germany’s constitutional identity is embodied in the principles laid 
down in Arts. 1 and 20 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). 
13 ESM Judgment, supra note 1, para. 213. See also the explanations of the Court id. at para. 214 (quoted also in 
the OMT Ruling, para. 28): “[N]o permanent mechanisms may be created under international treaties which are 
tantamount to accepting liability for decisions by free will of other states, above all if they entail consequences 
which are hard to calculate. The Bundestag must individually approve every large-scale federal aid measure on 
the international or European Union level made in solidarity resulting in expenditure.” 
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States, and whether a transgression of the ECB’s mandate follows in particular 
from:  
(i) the fact that the OMT Programme is linked to assistance 
under EFSF/ESM;  
(ii) the selectivity of the envisaged bond purchases;  
(iii) the OMT Programme running in parallel with assistance 
under EFSF/ESM; or  
(iv) the fact that it might bypass the terms and conditions of 
these assistance programmes. 
(b) Whether the OMT Decision is incompatible with the prohibition on monetary 
financing according to Article 123 TFEU, and whether a violation of this provision 
follows, in particular, from the fact that 
(i) bond purchases by the ECB are potentially unlimited in 
volume;  
(ii) according to the OMT Decision, bond purchases could take 
place immediately after the emission of bonds by a Member 
State;  
(iii) the ECB “interfere[s] with market logic” by potentially 
holding bonds to maturity;  
(iv) bonds could be purchased irrespective of the issuing 
sovereign’s credit rating; and 
(v) the ECB does not envisage demanding for itself preferred 
creditor status, but would in case of a default be treated 
equally with private bond holders. 
 
Although the Constitutional Court refers these questions to the ECJ, it already makes it 
clear in its ruling that it considers the OMT Decision to exceed the ECB’s mandate (Articles 
119, 127 TFEU) and to be in violation of the prohibition on monetary financing of national 
budgets (Article 123 TFEU), unless the Decision is interpreted in narrow terms that are 




In particular, the Constitutional Court holds that the OMT Decision “might not be 
objectionable” if it were “interpreted or limited in its validity” in a way that ensures that 
OMTs do not undermine the conditionality of EFSF/ESM and are only supportive of (rather 
than determining) economic policies in the Union. This is only possible, in the view of the 
Constitutional Court, if the ECB’s participation in a debt cut is excluded, limits for purchase 





                                            
14 Id. at para. 100. 
15 Id. 
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The ruling raises a number of questions, not only regarding the interpretation of EU law 
and the mandate of the ECB, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, the supremacy of 
European law and the relationship between the ECJ and the courts of the Member States. 
 
In this article, we will focus on the first of these sets of issues: the operation and effect of 
OMTs and how they fit within the framework of the monetary union established by the 
TFEU. However, it is submitted that this has also implications for the relevance of the other 
issues raised in this case. We argue that the Constitutional Court’s ruling is based on an 
incomplete understanding of the economic rationale and intended functioning of the OMT 
Decision. Within its margin of discretion, as defined by the Treaty, the ECB can, and we 
submit that it has signaled that it will, implement the OMT Decision lawfully and in 
compliance with the principle of conferral. If this is correct, there is no conflict between 
European law and German constitutional law. Importantly, this result does not depend on 
an altered interpretation of the Treaty by the Constitutional Court, but merely on a 
different approach to how the OMT Decision should be characterized. 
 
We will first show how the restrictive understanding of the OMT Decision by the 
Constitutional Court, and the narrow requirements for its implementation as set out in the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling, limit the options that both the ECJ and the Constitutional 
Court have in resolving the potential constitutional conflict and at the same time making 
allowance for the necessity of providing for an effective mechanism to safeguard the 
common currency (Part B). We will then provide an overview of several economic features 
of monetary unions that are essential for an understanding of the functioning of OMT (Part 
C). In Part D, we will use these economic concepts to analyze the validity of the 
Constitutional Court’s arguments and characterize the OMT Decision as a monetary policy 
measure. Part E concludes. 
 
B. A German Catch-22? 
 
On a very high level, the judgment’s effects can—in our view—be summarized as follows. 
The Constitutional Court has largely made up its mind about the legality of the ECB’s OMT 
Programme. It concludes that, if implemented in accordance with the text of the ECB’s 
announcement,
16
 it is very likely incompatible with the Treaty as interpreted by the 
Constitutional Court. The significance of the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the 
Treaty is, of course, that it simultaneously delineates the inviolable boundaries of the 
German constitution in the present context.
17
 Consequently, nothing is gained from a 
broad interpretation by the ECJ of the Treaty provisions in question, at least from a 
German constitutional law perspective. 
  
                                            
16 Press Release, supra note 2. 
17 See OMT Ruling at para. 55. 
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The assessment is subject, however, to the ECJ’s interpretation of the OMT Decision—not, 
ultimately, the Treaty—or equivalently its setting of boundaries for the relevant 
implementation of OMT. If, and it seems only if, the ECJ interprets the scope of a Treaty-
compliant OMT Programme in a way that complies with the conditions set out in the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment,
18
 or otherwise limits it in accordance with this set of 
criteria, the Programme could still be found valid by both the European and the German 
courts. Thus, an unsolvable and highly problematic conflict between the ECJ’s and the 
Constitutional Court’s interpretation of primary EU law could be avoided. 
 
If this account of the decision is correct, this ultimately leaves us with three possible 
scenarios: 
 
(1) The ECJ decides that the OMT Decision in effect envisages actions by the ECB, 
which are incompatible with its interpretation of the Treaty. 
(2) The ECJ decides that the OMT Decision, even if taken as interpreted by the 
Constitutional Court, is in line with the ECB’s mandate under the Treaty and in 
particular does not violate Articles 119, 123, and/or 127 of the TFEU. 
(3) The ECJ interprets the Treaty in a way that sets effective limits to any 
implementation of the OMT Decision, and the resulting limits happen to be 
compatible with the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the relevant Treaty 
constraints. In other words, the ECJ could effectively impose the same limits and 
conditions on the implementation of OMT as the Constitutional Court suggests in 
paragraph 100 of its judgment. 
 




 In the first (unlikely) scenario, the OMT Decision clearly could not be implemented 
by the ECB, because doing so would violate the ECJ’s interpretation of the ECB’s 
mandate, which undoubtedly is binding on the ECB.
20
  
 In the second scenario, the ECJ’s interpretation of the Treaty would—at least very 
likely—be incompatible with the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the 
Treaty.
21
 Since, in interpreting the Treaty, the Constitutional Court follows the 
boundaries of German constitutional law, it would not be able to defer to the 
ECJ’s interpretation in this case. From the Constitutional Court’s perspective, this 
scenario would be the result of an extension of the Union’s competences in 
                                            
18 Id. at para. 100; see supra text to note 15. 
19 This is a reference to the paradox described in JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961).  
20 See, e.g., Case C-11/00 Commission v. ECB [2003] ECR I-7147 (regarding the, admittedly limited, accountability 
of the ECB). 
21 See OMT Ruling at paras. 56, 84. 
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violation of the principle of conferral, thus triggering the Constitutional Court’s 
ultra vires review and identity review.
22
 Although this would not necessarily have 
a direct legal effect on the ECB’s ability to implement OMT, it would trigger what 
could be called a “duty to sabotage,” i.e. an obligation on the part of all German 
public officials to work towards a reversal of the OMT Decision and to prevent its 
implementation.
23
 It seems reasonably clear that this situation would, at the very 
least, substantially reduce the confidence of market participants as to the 
practical possibility of implementing the OMT Decision. 
 The third scenario may well, at first glance, seem like a door the Constitutional 
Court left open for the ECJ. It allows for a solution in which interpretations of the 
Treaty by the ECJ and the Constitutional Court are compatible (as in the first 
scenario), but without directly declaring the OMT Decision unlawful. On closer 
examination, however, it becomes clear that this is not in fact a way out. Although 
it would solve a legal problem,
24
 this comes at high cost. As we will argue in Part 
D, following the Constitutional Court would necessarily render any future use of 
OMT ineffective. 
 
The Catch-22, then, is that only rendering OMT ineffective can save it. Else, the ECJ can 
only choose between declaring OMT illegal itself, or leave this task to the Constitutional 
Court. This assessment is of course based on the assumptions that, first, the Constitutional 
Court does not ultimately “settle for less,” i.e. accept an interpretation of the OMT 
Decision that is broader than the one suggested in its judgment to be compatible with 
German constitutional law, and that, second, an OMT Programme re-interpreted or 
otherwise limited so as to comply with the Constitutional Court’s OMT Ruling would 
indeed be meaningless and ineffective.  
 
We believe the latter assumption to be true for reasons discussed in Part D; we will argue, 
however, that there are good reasons for the Constitutional Court to relax the 
requirements it set out in its ruling and accept a wider range of possible implementations 
of the OMT Decision to be compatible with the Treaty and with German constitutional law. 
As we will show, these reasons do not ultimately depend on disagreeing with the 
Constitutional Court on the legal boundaries set by the Treaty. We will argue that there is 
scope for an implementation of the OMT Decision that is compatible with the fundamental 
arguments put forward by the Constitutional Court in interpreting the Treaty and that, by 
extension, respects the limits set by German constitutional law as interpreted by the 
Constitutional Court. In going beyond the narrow conditions established by the 
Constitutional Court for OMT, such an implementation, it is submitted, is both legal and 
                                            
22 See supra text to notes 6-13. 
23 See OMT Ruling at para. 49. 
24 i.e. that of irreconcilable differences in the interpretation of the Treaty. 
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effective, and thus constitutes a possible way out of the Catch 22. Our argument is based 
on the economic rationale of the OMT Decision, which we will discuss in the following 
sections. 
 
C. Economics of Incomplete Monetary Unions 
 
I. Incomplete Monetary Unions 
 
The European monetary union has been credited with reducing the costs of conducting 
cross-border trade within the EU, improving allocative efficiency, and being an engine of 
European integration. However, it is also commonly accepted that monetary unions may 
give rise to dynamics that distort market operations and prove detrimental to individual 
members of the union. Most importantly, by joining a monetary union, a country gives up 
the possibility of unilaterally setting monetary policy to stimulate demand or otherwise 
react to national economic conditions, and, naturally, a permanent monetary union also 
means that economic imbalances can no longer be counterbalanced by changes in the 
exchange rate. In particular, members lose the ability to cause a depreciation of their 
currency and thereby increase the competitiveness of the domestic economy. Joining a 
monetary union also means that a country will have to start borrowing in a currency it 
does not (directly) control. This exposes member countries to liquidity risks: a national 
central bank, no matter how independent, will usually be perceived by the market to stand 
ready “to do whatever is necessary” to avert liquidity risks. This essentially means that 
sovereigns outside a monetary union have, or are perceived as having, “access to the 
printing press” in a manner members of a monetary union do not. 
 
These features of a monetary union naturally make member countries vulnerable to 
economic shocks and may, under certain conditions, set in motion a chain of events 
leading, in the worst case, to the insolvency of the country. In this picture, investor 
sentiment plays a crucial role. Let us assume that a country’s economy is affected by a 
negative demand shock. The necessary adjustment cannot be accomplished by simply 
adjusting the interest rate and exchange rate and thus stimulating demand.
25
 Instead, 
governments will need to implement deflationary policies to devalue wages internally. As a 
consequence, they may experience a recession, possibly leading to a growing budget 
                                            
25 It is controversial to what extent monetary policy and flexible exchange rates are able to bring about the 
necessary adjustment to demand or supply shocks. The main theoretical argument in favour of a flexible 
exchange rate regime was put forward by Milton Friedman, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, in MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953), 159. For a recent empirical study see Atish R. Ghosh, Jonathan 
D. Ostry & Charalambos G. Tsangarides, Exchange Rate Regimes and the Stability of the International Monetary 
System, IMF OCCASIONAL PAPERS 270 (2011). It seems clear that at least in cases of severe macroeconomic shocks 
and financial crises, such as the one witnessed in the Eurozone in the last years, monetary policy can assist 
countries in making the adjustment process less painful. In comparison, for the possibilities of European countries 
to react to failed economic policies by using monetary policy before monetary union, see for example Jeffrey 
Sachs and Charles Wyplosz, The Economic Consequences of President Mitterrand, 1 ECONOMIC POLICY 261 (1986). 
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deficit and thus calling into question the country’s ability to pay bondholders. As investor 
sentiment becomes more unfavorable, the country’s costs of refinancing increase. This 
further impairs the fiscal position of the country, and the liquidity problems that the 
country faces may ultimately develop into a solvency crisis.
26
 In this sense, the position of 
the members of a monetary union is comparable to that of private banks.
27
 The banking 
sector is characterized by a mismatch between liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. As a 
result, it is inherently fragile and prone to bank runs induced by a loss of confidence in the 
solvency of financial institutions. The member countries of a monetary union are in a 
similar position. Their assets, future claims on taxpayers and physical assets, cannot easily 
be liquidated to meet short-term needs to finance a deficit.
28
 Without a lender of last 




In federal systems, fiscal policies play an important role in facilitating the adjustment of the 
different regions to asymmetric shocks.
30
 Whether fiscal centralization is a necessary 
condition for a monetary union is a matter of debate,
31
 and it has been pointed out that a 
number of federal systems, including the United States until 1929, established monetary 
unions without providing for a major role of the central budget.
32
 However, it is clear that 
some mechanism is necessary to enable the union to react to shocks and prevent a loss of 
confidence in the liquidity of the national (or regional) government, which may otherwise 
lead to a self-fulfilling solvency crisis as described in the preceding paragraph. The 
mechanism can be market-based, in the form of flexible wages and mobile labor moving 
quickly from the countries (or regions) experiencing a negative demand shock to those 
experiencing a positive shock, or it can be in the form of the consolidation of parts of the 
national budgets and debts and the control of budgetary policies. Both types of 
                                            
26 For a more detailed description of this process see PAUL DE GRAUWE, ECONOMICS OF MONETARY UNION 1–9 (9th ed. 
2012). 
27 Id. at 203. 
28 Paul De Grauwe & Yuemei Ji, Self-fulfilling crises in the Eurozone: An empirical test, 34 J. OF INT’L MONEY AND FIN. 
15, 17 (2013). 
29 See e.g. Charles A.E. Goodhart, Myths about the Lender of Last Resort, 2 INT. FINANCE 339 (1999); Charles A.E. 
Goodhart and Haizhou Huang, A Simple Model of an International Lender of Last Resort, 29 ECONOMIC NOTES 1 
(2000). 
30 An example for such a policy is the system of fiscal equalization in Germany, where about 20 billion Euros are 
redistributed annually between the states and from the federal budget to the states. See Federal Statistical 
Office, Ausgaben und Einnahmen (Expenditure and Revenue), 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/OeffentlicheFinanzenSteuern/OeffentlicheFinanzen
Steuern.html (follow “Länderfinanzausgleich” hyperlink), for data. 
31 See the references in Lorenzo Bini Smaghi & Silvia Vori, Rating the EC as an Optimal Currency Area: Is It Worse 
than the US?, in FINANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, 78, 94 (6th ed. 1992). 
32 Id. 
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mechanisms are not well developed in the EU. Labor mobility is, of course, legally 
facilitated by the TFEU and has increased over the years, but various de facto impediments 
to a fully integrated labor market persist, for example language barriers and differences in 
social security systems.
33
 In addition, wages tend to be rigid and do not adjust 




In the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, the European institutions and the EU Member 
States have made great efforts to establish financial assistance facilities in the form of the 
EFSF and ESM, improve economic governance and control of the Member States’ 
budgets,
35
 and complete the banking union.
36
 However, in particular the EFSF and ESM 
have been criticized as being insufficient in size to function as an effective backstop 
preventing the emergence of a crisis of confidence. In this context, the European monetary 
union has been described as an incomplete monetary union.
37
 The ECB’s intervention 
                                            
33 Herbert Brücker & Thomas Eger, The Law and Economics of the Free Movement of Persons in the European 
Union, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 162 (Thomas Eger & Hans-Bernd Schäfer 
eds., 2012); Philip R. Lane, The Real Effects of European Monetary Union, J. ECON. PERSPECT. 47, 60 (2006); Klaus F. 
Zimmermann, Labor Mobility and the Integration of European Labor Markets, in THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN 
LABOUR MARKETS 9 (Ewald Nowotny et al. eds., 2009). The lack of full factor mobility raises doubts whether the 
euro area can be characterised as what has been termed an ‘optimum currency area’, see Robert A. Mundell, A 
Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, 51  AM. ECON. REV. 657, 661 (1961). The literature analyzing this issue is vast. 
For two examples see BARRY EICHENGREEN, EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND ANALYSIS (1997), in 
particular pp. 51 et seq.: Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?; Paul De Grauwe and Wim Vanhaverbeke, Is 
Europe an Optimum Currency Area?: Evidence from Regional Data, in POLICY ISSUES IN THE OPERATION OF CURRENCY 
UNIONS 111 (Paul R. Masson & Mark P. Taylor eds., 1993). 
34 Kai Christoffel et al., The Role of Labor Markets for Euro Area Monetary Policy, 53 EUR. ECON. REV. 908 (2009). 
35 The various regulatory measures to improve economic coordination and fiscal discipline are known collectively 
as the “Stability and Growth Pact,” complemented by the so-called Fiscal Compact contained in the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, an intergovernmental treaty that is 
binding on the ratifying Eurozone members. The original Stability and Growth Pact dates from 1997. As part of the 
EU’s reaction to the financial crisis, the original rules were comprehensively reformed in 2011 and 2013 by two 
sets of measures, the so-called Six-Pack and Two-Pack. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/legal_texts/index_en.htm, for references to 
the relevant legislative measures. 
36 Responsibility for the direct prudential supervision of credit institutions in the Eurozone countries and 
additional participating countries was conferred on the ECB by Council Regulation 1024/2013 conferring specific 
tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions, 2013 O.J. (L 287/63); and Parliament and Council Regulation 1022/2013 amending Regulation 
1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), 2013 O.J. (L 287/5). The 
conferral is based on Article 127(6) TFEU. The single resolution mechanism will be established by a regulation, see 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform 
procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single 
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund, COM (2013) 0520 final (July 10, 2013). 
37 DE GRAUWE, supra note 26, at 17, 124. 
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measures, including the OMT Programme, aim at remedying problems related to these 




II. Multiple Equilibria 
 
There exists an extensive literature on market failures and the self-fulfilling nature of 
currency crises.
39
 One aspect of the economics of currency crises, the possibility of multiple 
equilibria, seems particularly relevant in the present context and will prove central to our 
analysis below. It thus deserves a brief—and necessarily simplified—treatment here. 
 
As put by the Constitutional Court,
40
 the interest rate charged by investors for extending 
credit to a sovereign “always only result[s] from the market participants’ expectations.”
41
 
This is of course unquestionably true—market actors’ willingness to purchase sovereign 
bonds at a particular price (and thus accepting a particular bond yield) will depend on their 
expectations as to the debtor’s future ability to repay the bonds. What is omitted from this 
statement, however, is the inter-dependence of these two factors. 
 
                                            
38 ECB, MONTHLY BULLETIN 7 (Sep. 2012), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/mobu/mb201209en.pdf. 
Already before the Eurozone crisis, it was pointed out that the insufficient coordination of national fiscal policies 
and the lack of a Eurozone-wide fiscal system that could facilitate the adjustment to macroeconomic shocks might 
jeopardize the political viability of the euro and that the ECB could be forced to step in and take emergency 
measures, see Lane, supra note 33, 64. 
39 See, e.g., Guillermo Calvo, Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 647 (1988); 
Maurice Obstfeld, Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1037 (1996); Paul 
Krugman, Are Currency Crises Self-Fulfilling?, 11 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 345–407 (1996); CARMEN REINHART 
& KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 60 (2009); De Grauwe & Ji, supra note 
28; Philip R. Lane, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 26 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49, 60 (2012); and Paul De 
Grauwe, The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone, 45 AUSTL. ECON. REV. 255 (2012). For empirical support of this 
concept’s relevance in the present context, see Manfred Gärtner & Björn Griesbach, Rating Agencies, Self-
Fulfilling Prophecy and Multiple equilibria?: An Empirical Model of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 2009-2011 
(Universität St. Gallen, Discussion Paper No. 2012–2015, 2012), available at 
http://www1.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-1215.pdf; and Daniel Gros, A Simple Model of Multiple 
Equilibria and Default (Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Document No. 366, 2012), available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/35886/1/WD366_DG_Multiple_Equilibria.pdf. See also the initiative by Marcel Fratzscher et 
al., A Call for support for the European Central Bank’s OMT Programme, BERLIN OECONOMICUS (July 19, 2013), 
https://berlinoeconomicus.diw.de/monetarypolicy/a-call-for-support-for-the-european-central-banks-omt-
programme/, which has been signed by some 250 economists around the world. 
40 See OMT Ruling at para. 98. 
41 The Constitutional Court continues by stating that bond spreads are therefore “regardless of their rationality, 
essential for market-based pricing.” OMT Ruling at para. 98. It is hard to see content in this statement—bond 
spreads (i.e. here the difference between the bond yields of different Member States) are not “essential” for 
market-based pricing, they are the result of pricing, whether rational or irrational, and whether market-based or 
not. 
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Whenever a sovereign is perceived to pose a non-negligible default risk, investors will be 
unwilling to buy its bonds unless the bond yield exceeds the yield of an alternative risk-free 
investment.
42
 In equilibrium, the prevailing bond yield has to fully compensate investors 
for the (perceived) additional risk they expose themselves to by choosing to buy the risky 
bond, rather than, say, a German sovereign bond. 
  
A sovereign default occurs when a sovereign borrower is unable to raise enough revenue 
to pay the interest on its debt, or –perhaps more likely– when it is unwilling to make 
interest payments, rather than spending the available resources on providing essential 
government services such as health care or pensions, because doing so would be too costly 
politically.
43
 The perceived risk of a sovereign bond—i.e. the probability of a default—thus 
depends on three factors. The first factor is the debtor’s ability—or willingness
44
—to 
generate a primary fiscal surplus, i.e. the ability to raise revenues in excess of government 
expenditures, before any interest payments on existing debt are made. Second, the 
probability of default depends on the amount of its debt on which interest must be paid 




Finally, a country’s riskiness also depends on the interest rate necessary to induce 
investors to extend credit to the sovereign. This seemingly self-evident point has important 
implications for distinguishing between different types of sovereign debt crises and, 
consequently, classifying different policy remedies. It is this interdependence or “feedback 
effect”—namely that default risk is reflected by market interest rates, but that at the same 
time market interest rates also affect the default risk they reflect—that is the central 




Clearly, countries within a monetary union and countries indebted in a foreign currency 
can be insolvent in the traditional sense.
47
 Let us first consider a somewhat extreme case 
                                            
42 In the current context, it is best to view the yields in German sovereign bonds as representing this “risk-free” 
interest rate. See, e.g., Paul De Grauwe, The European Central Bank as Lender of Last Resort in the Government 
Bond Markets, 59 CESIFO ECON. STUDIES 520, 529 (2013). 
43 This is a (highly) simplified version of the currency crisis model described in DAVID ROMER, ADVANCED 
MACROECONOMICS 632 (4th ed. 2012). 
44 Creditors will have certain expectations as to the extent to which revenue can be increased or public 
expenditures reduced without rendering the option of defaulting relatively more attractive. 
45 In essence, the term structure of a country’s indebtedness determines the proportion of a country’s debt that 
falls due and thus must be refinanced every year. 
46 See the literature cited supra at note 39 and accompanying text. 
47 We will ignore the fact that countries indebted in a currency they control themselves cannot (at least under 
normal circumstances) “default” in the traditional sense, given that they can always print enough money to 
satisfy any creditors’ claims (albeit at the cost of creating inflation). 
2014] Law Meets Economics 293 
             
where a country is unable to raise enough tax revenues (or reduce expenditures by 
enough) to even create a primary fiscal surplus that suffices to pay the risk-free interest 
rate on all its debt. Since investors ex hypothesi will not accept an interest rate lower than 
the risk free rate, such a country will certainly be unable to refinance itself in the 
marketplace. In this situation, because refinancing of existing debt is impossible, only 
support in the form of wealth transfers (e.g. from other countries or international 
organizations) can avert the country’s eventual default. 
  
However, a country’s insolvency does not depend on the existence of these extreme 
conditions. Even if a country’s tax revenue suffices to pay the risk-free rate, investors will 
still demand an adequate risk premium whenever they consider the borrower to represent 
a non-negligible risk of default, despite it only having to pay the low risk-free rate. Based 
on the prevalent bond yields since the beginning of the current crisis, this is the case for 
almost all Eurozone countries except Germany. Under these conditions, the sovereign will 
have to raise the interest rate it offers to investors in order to (re-)finance its debt. Doing 
so, however, necessarily also increases the probability of default. Thus, raising the offered 
interest rate induces and deters investors at the same time—it induces investment 
because it increases a return if no default occurs; it deters investors because the very fact 
that the borrower promises higher interest payments increases the likelihood of the 
borrower no longer being able to raise enough revenue to honor this commitment.  
 
It should intuitively make sense,
48
 therefore, that a sovereign can be in a situation where 
the inducing effect of an interest rate increase is always outweighed by the increased 
probability of default that it triggers. In other words, such a country is not an attractive 
investment at any interest rate, because at any given level of interest rates, the default 
probability is higher than the interest rate promise can justify.
49
 In this case, the sovereign 
is in effect insolvent, because no (profit maximizing) investor has an incentive to extend 
credit to such a borrower at any promised rate of return. 
 
There also exist two more benign scenarios. The standard case is a situation where one 
interest rate exists at which investors regard themselves as fairly compensated for the 
default risk they accept. This means that the probability of default at that interest rate is 
justified given that interest rate. In other words, a market equilibrium exists at that 
interest rate. Such an equilibrium is generally stable. Any (at least any moderate) increase 
                                            
48 See, for example, ROMER, supra note43, for a formal model of this process. 
49 Let us assume that a country has a probability of default of 5%, if it were to pay the risk-free interest rate. Since 
5% is too high a risk for only receiving the risk-free rate, investors demand a higher return. The country doubles 
the interest rate, but as a result its default probability rises to, say, 15%. Investors may say that a default 
probability of 15% is too high, even at the higher interest rate. Further increases of the interest rate always lead 
to the same result —investors are not interested in an investment. There thus exists no equilibrium in which the 
country avoids default, unless the country receives a wealth transfer that, for instance, reduces the amount of its 
outstanding debt and thus the probability of default. 
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in interest rates without changes in the country’s economic situation will tend to be 
reversed by market forces, as it will make investors either feel over- or undercompensated 
for the risk they take on, leading to an adjustment of bond prices.  
 
It is, however, also possible for multiple equilibria to exist for a particular borrower. This is 
the case where, at a given low interest rate prevailing in the market, the equilibrium exists 
as above. A sudden increase in the interest rate demanded by investors, however, pushes 
the market to a second, albeit unstable, equilibrium. Such a sudden increase can, for 
instance, be triggered by fears about the reversibility of a currency union which had 
previously been perceived, and was designed, as being irreversible, and the ensuing 
redenomination risk. Moreover, the market may well be overreacting to such fears, just as 
even modest doubts about a bank’s solvency and fears of a bank run may cause an actual 
bank run. 
 
Why, one may ask, will the market for the same country’s bonds also be at equilibrium at 
high yields, even if nothing much has changed fundamentally? As discussed above, a 
country’s solvency also depends on the interest rate charged by investors. Thus, the 
question simply is whether, after an increase in interest rates, the risk of default and the 
return investors receive is justified when compared to other assets. Because the increase 
in interest rates will also have increased the probability of default, this is possible. A closer 
examination also shows that interest rates will not, at least not necessarily, return to the 
previous stable equilibrium. Rather, it is possible that two equilibria co-exits: one with a 
low interest rate, which, crucially, is adequate in market terms to compensate investors for 
the risks taken; and a bad equilibrium, where high interest rates have the effect of 
increasing the likelihood of default and because of this are also justified – i.e. they are also 
equilibrium rates because they compensate investors for the higher risk. To put it 
differently, a country may be required to pay higher interest rates because, given that it 
has to pay that high rate, it is indeed a high risk borrower. This holds true even if investors 
are individually rational and recognise that collectively accepting a lower interest rate 
would leave them no worse off. 
 
Two central implications are worth highlighting here. First, two sovereign borrowers can 
effectively be charged very different interest rates by rational investors, even if they are in 
very similar fiscal situations to start with. Second, the “bad” equilibrium is unstable. Even 
small changes in the market’s sentiments can trigger a self-fulfilling sovereign debt crisis, 
culminating in an avoidable default. Because even a small increase in the prevailing 
interest rate, or an insignificant change in the economic prospects of a country, increases 
the default probability of the country in question, this can induce investors to demand an 
even higher interest rate in response. Very quickly, the market can reach yet another, and 
final equilibrium—namely investors are unwilling to lend to the sovereign at any interest 
rate because default is certain. Given that sovereign defaults are always costly to society, 
an entirely avoidable default triggered by market developments can hardly be described as 
anything but a clear market failure. 
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Overall, this (very simplified) account leaves us with three different situations a Eurozone 
member can be in. First, it can be at a stable equilibrium, in which case the questions 
considered by the Constitutional Court do not matter. Second, a country can be in a “bad” 
and unstable equilibrium, in which fundamentally insignificant changes in the country’s 
prospects or in investors’ sentiments can have drastic effects. Third, a country can simply 
be insolvent, requiring assistance in the form of wealth transfers in order to avoid a default 
(at least without exiting the Euro). We will argue below that differences between the latter 
two scenarios are closely linked to the legal questions about the ECB’s mandate and the 
prohibition on monetary financing in the Treaty. They are thus central for the legal 
assessment of the OMT Programme and its compatibility with the Treaty. 
 
D. Economic Logic and Legal Reasoning 
 
I. The ECB’s Mandate 
 
1. Monetary vs. Economic Policy 
 
The ECB is set up in the tradition of the German model of central banking, which is made 
clear by two features of the institutional arrangements. First, the primary objective of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is defined as the maintenance of price stability. 
The mandate of the ESCB encompasses other objectives that “support the general 
economic policies in the Union,” but these objectives are subordinated to the preservation 
of price stability.
50
 Second, the TFEU stresses the political independence of the ECB, which 
shall not take instructions from the institutions of the EU or any government of a Member 
State.
51
 Both features mirror the organization of the German Bundesbank
52
 and helped to 
overcome initial skepticism in Germany towards monetary union.
53
 Empirical evidence 
                                            
50 TFEU arts. 119(2), 127; Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European 
Central Bank, art. 2, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 230. The main principles defining the role and institutional structure of the 
European System of Central Banks and the ECB, including an emphasis on price stability, were already laid down 
in the Delors report. See COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, REPORT ON ECONOMIC AND 
MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 21–23 (1989). 
51 TFEU art. 130. 
52 See the original version of the German Bundesbank law establishing the central bank: Gesetz über die Deutsche 
Bundesbank [Law on the German Bundesbank], Bundesgesetz Blatt I [BGBL. I – Federal Law Gesetz] §§ 3, 12 
(1957). Research indicates that the ECB’s independence is even more pronounced than that of the Bundesbank. 
For a review of these findings and a critical discussion, see LORENZO BINI SMAGHI & DANIEL GROS, OPEN ISSUES IN 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANKING 125–132 (2000). 
53 Niels Thygesen, The Delors Report and European Economic and Monetary Union, 65 INT’L AFF. 637, 646–647 
(1989). Price stability continues to be of central concern to the Bundesbank. For this reason, the German Central 
Bank was critical of the ECB’s actions during the financial crisis, see for example: Jens Weidmann, 
Eingangserklärung anlässlich der mündlichen Verhandlung im Hauptsacheverfahren ESM/EZB [Opening Statement 
at the hearing in the proceedings for ESM/ECB] (June 11, 2013), available at 
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indicates that the ECB has pursued the objective of price stability consistently and 
successfully since it assumed monetary policy making authority. For most of the bank’s 




The emphasis on price stability reflects the view that monetary policy can only influence 
macroeconomic conditions in the long run by focusing on inflation.
55
 The intuition is clear. 
An expansionary monetary policy may be able to stimulate consumption and, as a 
consequence, increase output and reduce unemployment in the short run, but it will lead 
to higher prices and higher wages, which will bring unemployment back to its “natural” 
level.
56
 The only long-run effect is inflation. Since central banks cannot know what the 
“natural” rate of unemployment is, they should therefore not seek to influence real 




Until recently, this view was widely held in academic and policy circles.
58
 With the financial 
crisis, however, academics and central bankers have called for a greater role of central 
banks in monitoring and preserving financial stability.
59
 While the precise tasks of the 
central bank in the area of financial stability are a matter of debate, the issue is not so 
                                                                                                                
http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/DE/Kurzmeldungen/Stellungnahmen/2013_06_11_esm_ezb.html, and 
the Bundesbank’s submission in these proceedings, pp. 12–13, available at 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/DE/Presse/Stellungnahmen/stellungnahmen.html.  
54 DE GRAUWE, supra note 26, at 178 (arguing that interest rate decisions of the ECB were close to what was 
optimal for the largest Eurozone economies—France, Germany, and Italy), 184–185 (showing that from 1999-
2011 inflation was on average 2.02%). 
55 This view goes back to Milton Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1968). For this 
reason, standard economic theory speaks of the “long-run neutrality” of money. For a non-technical overview, 
see ECB, THE MONETARY POLICY OF THE ECB 55 (3rd ed. 2011), available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/monetarypolicy2011en.pdf. 
56 Id. at 10. 
57 There is some disagreement about the intermediate target the central bank should choose in order to achieve 
the policy goal of price stability. Friedman, id. at 15, favored a monetary total, while several central banks now 
target inflation. See DE GRAUWE, supra note 26, at 197. The ECB follows a two-pillar approach, consisting of 
economic and monetary analysis. As far as economic analysis is concerned, the ECB reviews a broad range of real 
variables, cost and price indicators, and fiscal policy in order to assess the likely development of prices and 
identify potential threats to price stability. Monetary analysis seeks to identify the growth rate of the money 
stock, which is associated with inflation in the medium to long run. On the basis of the information from both 
pillars, the ECB’s Governing Council then takes its monetary policy decision. See ECB, supra note 55, at 69–82, for 
an explanation of both pillars in detail. 
58 A notable exception is the Federal Reserve System of the United States, which pursues price stability as one of 
several policy goals on an equal footing. See EMMANUEL APEL, CENTRAL BANKING SYSTEMS COMPARED: THE ECB, THE PRE-
EURO BUNDESBANK, AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 31–32 (2003). 
59 See, e.g., DE GRAUWE, supra note 26, at 190; Otmar Issing, A New Paradigm for Monetary Policy, 16 INT’L FIN. 
273, 279 (2013). 
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much one of redefining the ultimate policy goal of central banks, but rather of the 
intermediate targets that the bank pursues and the information it relies on when making 
monetary policy decisions. It is clear that developments endangering financial stability, for 
example asset price bubbles, can affect price stability and that the central bank, as part of 
its price stability mandate, can take appropriate measures to counteract such 
developments. This is also the approach of the ECB. The Bank reiterates in its latest 
monetary policy overview that “the contribution [of monetary policy] to financial stability 
is subordinated to the objective of price stability.”
60
 Furthermore, the bank’s approach is in 
line with “conservative,” monetarist thinking in that the ECB does not attempt to target 
asset prices, for example by broadening the definition of “price stability,” which is 
currently based on an index of consumer prices, to include asset prices.
61
 Rather, within its 
two-pillar approach,
62
 the ECB monitors asset prices and seeks to identify developments 
posing a risk to price stability over the medium to long term. If such a risk is identified, the 
ECB employs a strategy that has been called “leaning against the wind.” It adopts a 
somewhat tighter policy stance than it would have done under more normal 
macroeconomic conditions in order to avoid feeding into the bubble, as arguably 
happened in the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States.
63
 The 
question remains whether the ECB is also empowered to adopt unconventional policy 
measures, such as the OMT Programme, within its monetary policy mandate to safeguard 
the financial system. We will analyze this question in the next section. 
 
2. Legal Framework of the ESCB 
 
The Constitutional Court held that the OMT Decision was likely to exceed the ECB’s 
mandate as laid down in the TFEU and the ESCB Statute. The Court distinguished between 
the two objectives of the ESCB specified in Article 127(1) TFEU: The primary objective of 
maintaining price stability and the secondary objective of supporting the general economic 
policies in the Union. It advanced six arguments to substantiate its conclusion that the 
OMT Decision was in violation of both the primary and the secondary objectives and hence 
transgressed the ECB’s mandate. The Court argued that the OMT Decision did not fall 
within the field of monetary policy because of (1) its objective; (2) its selectivity; (3) the 
parallelism with the assistance programs agreed on by the Member States; and (4) the 
bypassing of the narrow limits that the European Stability Mechanism imposed on the 
                                            
60 ECB, supra note 55, at 83. 
61 Id. at 84–85. See id. at 64, for a formal definition of “price stability.” 
62 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
63 ECB, supra note 55, at 85. The ECB does not see the task of monetary policy as having to prevent asset bubbles 
from occurring or “pricking” such bubbles. The bank therefore emphasizes that it is important to adopt a carefully 
calibrated response that does not affect economic growth and takes into account that policy makers may have 
difficulties in assessing whether a speculative bubble is in the process of forming. See id. at 84–85. 
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purchase of government bonds. The Court further argued that the OMT Decision could not 
be qualified as support of the general economic policies in the Union because (5) the 
volume of the financial assistance provided through outright monetary transactions was 
such that it could potentially multiply the assistance provided for by the European Stability 
Mechanism and thus “thwart”
64
 the agreed-upon volume and the imposed conditions; and 
(6) the ECB declared that it would decide on the start, continuation, and suspension of 
outright monetary transactions “in full discretion,” instead of merely retracing the 
decisions of the Commission or so-called Troika. We will group the six arguments under the 
following headings: (1) objective of the OMT Decision (dealing with (1); (2) technical 
features of outright monetary transactions (dealing with (2)-(4)); and (3) support of the 
economic policies in the Union (dealing with (5) and (6)). 
 
2.1 Objective of the OMT Decision 
 
According to the Constitutional Court, the immediate objective of the OMT Decision was 
the neutralization of spreads on government bonds of selected Member States that 
adversely affected the refinancing of these States.
65
 The Court argued that these interest 
spreads reflected “the skepticism of market participants that individual Member States will 
show sufficient budgetary discipline to stay permanently solvent” and that “the existence 
of such spreads [was] entirely intended” by the Treaty.
66
 In neutralizing the spreads, the 
ECB was, accordingly, acting in breach of the Treaty, including its mandate, since such 
outright monetary transactions did not constitute acts of monetary policy, but economic 
policy.
67
 The Court further explained that as to “the European Central Bank claiming to 
safeguard the current composition of the euro currency area with the OMT Decision . . . , 
this is obviously not a task of monetary policy but one of economic policy, which remains a 
responsibility of the Member States” pursuant to Articles 139 and 140 TFEU.
68
 According to 
the division of powers expressed in these articles, it was for the Member States “to 
prevent the reversibility of the Euro,” and they had acted upon this authorization by 




Several points can be made about this line of reasoning. First, the declared aim of the OMT 
Decision was not the neutralization of spreads on government bonds of selected Member 
States, but the “safeguarding [of] an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the 
                                            
64 In the German language version of the decision the Court uses the word “konterkarieren.” 
65 OMT Ruling at para. 70. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at para. 69. 
68 Id. at para. 72. 
69 Id. 
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singleness of the monetary policy.” The Constitutional Court does not consider this aim 
relevant in distinguishing between monetary and economic policy,
70
 but instead focuses on 
what it calls the “immediate objective,”
71
 which it sees in the elimination of spreads that 
are, in the view of the Court, a function of the insufficient budgetary discipline of the 
affected Member States.
72
 This is, however, not the economic rationale of the OMT 
Decision. The market for sovereign bonds in a monetary union is affected by two factors 
that potentially distort the pricing mechanism of the market, the moral hazard that exists if 
national governments can expect to be bailed out in case of insolvency,
73
 and the self-
                                            
70 See id. at paras. 95–97, in particular para. 96: “The fact that the purchase of government bonds can, under 
certain conditions, help to support the monetary policy objectives of the European System of Central Banks [here 
the correction of a disruption to the transmission mechanism] does not turn the OMT Decision itself into an act of 
monetary policy.” 
71 Id. at para. 69. 
72 In order to substantiate that this is the aim of the decision, the Constitutional Court makes references to ECB, 
MONTHLY BULLETIN 7 (Sep. 2012); ECB, MONTHLY BULLETIN 7–8 (Oct. 2012). See OMT Ruling at para. 70. However, the 
ECB’s explanation in these documents shows clearly that the intended economic effect of OMTs is not simply to 
neutralize spreads (see also the discussion in the text immediately following this footnote). On p. 7 of the 
Monthly Bulletin September 2012, the ECB states:  
OMTs aim at safeguarding the transmission mechanism in all euro 
area countries and the singleness of the monetary policy. OMTs will 
enable the Eurosystem to address severe distortions in government 
bond markets which originate, in particular, from unfounded fears on 
the part of investors of the reversibility of the euro, as reflected, inter 
alia, in widening differences in the pricing of short-term sovereign 
debt up to July 2012 . . . . In such an environment, OMTs will provide 
a fully effective backstop to avoid destructive scenarios with 
potentially severe challenges for price stability in the euro area. 
ECB, MONTHLY BULLETIN 7 (Sep. 2012). On p. 8 of the Monthly Bulletin October 2012, the ECB states:  
[S]pecific operational modalities have been set up to ensure that 
OMTs do not interfere with the three objectives of the monetary 
financing prohibition, namely safeguarding (i) the primary objective 
of price stability, (ii) central bank independence, and (iii) fiscal 
discipline. A major concern has been the need to ensure that this 
monetary policy instrument could not ultimately weaken fiscal 
discipline . . . . The current situation is characterised by severe 
distortions in government bond markets which originate, in 
particular, from unfounded fears on the part of investors of the 
reversibility of the euro. This translates into severe cases of 
malfunctioning in the price formation process in the government 
bond markets, which undermines the functioning of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. 
ECB, MONTHLY BULLETIN 8 (Oct. 2012). 
73 For a discussion of the moral hazard problem and its implications for the role of the central bank see, for 
example, BINI SMAGHI & GROS, supra note 52, at 45–49. 
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fulfilling dynamics of a loss of confidence in the solvency of a member of the monetary 
union and of a potential break-up of the euro zone. As discussed above, the loss of 
confidence may lead to a liquidity crisis, which may, in turn, develop into an actual 
solvency crisis because the affected country will only be able to refinance its debt at 
prohibitive interest rates.
74
 In this sense, the loss of confidence in the solvency of the 
country is self-fulfilling and the country may find itself in a “bad equilibrium.” The country 
will default because investors expect the country to do so, even though a “good” 





As is clear from the explanations given by the ECB, it is the aim of the OMT Decision to 
mediate between these two dynamics by, on the one hand, providing for ex ante unlimited 
bond purchases and thus removing the threat of a liquidity crisis leading to a self-fulfilling 
solvency crisis and, on the other hand, combining outright monetary transactions with the 
conditionality attached to an EFSF or ESM program to address the moral hazard problem. 
To put it differently, the OMT Decision is not intended to “neutralize” the differences in 
yields of bonds of different Member States, but to ”break” the expectations leading to a 
bad equilibrium.
76
 The announcement of the decision has also in practice not led to a 
                                            
74 See supra Part C. 
75 See supra Part C.II. For a model specifically dealing with members of a monetary union, see De Grauwe & Ji, 
supra note 28, at 33–35. It is important to note that this problem is particularly pronounced in a monetary union, 
because member countries cannot provide for potentially unlimited liquidity, see id. at 35. 
76 See ECB, MONTHLY BULLETIN 7 (Sep. 2012), supra note 72; ECB, MONTHLY BULLETIN 7–8 (Oct. 2012), supra note 72; 
and Introductory statement to the press conference with Q&A (Sep. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html (explanations of Mario Draghi after the 
OMT Decision was taken). In the Q&A session, Draghi is very clear: 
[T]he assessment of the Governing Council is that we are in a 
situation now where you have large parts of the euro area in what we 
call a “bad equilibrium”, namely an equilibrium where you may have 
self-fulfilling expectations that feed upon themselves and generate 
very adverse scenarios. So, there is a case for intervening, in a sense, 
to “break” these expectations, which, by the way, do not concern 
only the specific countries, but the euro area as a whole. And this 
would justify the intervention of the central bank. But then, we 
should not forget why countries have found themselves in a bad 
equilibrium to start with. And this is because of policy mistakes. That 
is why we need both legs to fix this situation and move from a bad 
equilibrium to a good equilibrium. If the central bank were to 
intervene without any actions on the part of governments, without 
any conditionality, the intervention would not be effective and the 
Bank would lose its independence. At the same time, we see that we 
are in a bad equilibrium and, therefore, policy action, though 
convincing, does not seem to produce – at least not in the relatively 
medium term – the results for which it is geared. So that is why we 
need both legs for this action. 
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neutralization of the yield differences, as Figure 1 shows. It should be emphasized that the 
aim of the OMT Decision, breaking the dynamics that lead to a self-fulfilling solvency crisis, 
is generally already achieved by the simple announcement that the central bank is, in 
principle, prepared to purchase government bonds up to an amount that is ex ante 
unlimited. The activation of the program is not necessary, as evidenced by events of the 
recent past. However, should the program be activated, the ECB would need to show that 
it does not purchase bonds (and as a consequence reduce spreads) beyond the point that 
moves the country away from the bad equilibrium in order to ensure compliance with the 
prohibition on monetary financing. 
 
 
Figure 1: Secondary market bond spreads 
 
It is puzzling that the Constitutional Court does not consider this economic rationale. The 
Court seems to have based its assessment exclusively on the moral hazard problem, the 
existence of which is not disputed by the ECB. In fact, in order to ensure that OMT only 
protects a country from entering a bad equilibrium, rather than providing financial 
assistance to countries that are insolvent, the ECB requires a mechanism that ensures that 
it withdraws any secondary market support if and when the country becomes insolvent. 
Tying OMT to conditionality under an EFSF/ESM program seems to us to be a suitable 
mechanism in this respect. The Court dismisses the ECB’s argument that the distortions in 
the sovereign bond markets stemmed “from unfounded fears on the part of investors of 
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the reversibility of the euro”
77
 by simply stating that “one cannot in practice divide interest 
rate spreads into a rational and an irrational part”
78
 and disregarding empirical studies that 
indicate the contrary.
79
 These are complex questions of economic theory and the 
explanatory power of quantitative models. Few, if any, economists today believe that 
markets are completely immune to inefficiencies, and wide areas of financial regulation are 
indeed designed to address situations in which markets would, left to themselves, produce 
sub-optimal results.
80
 It is questionable whether a court should attempt to reinterpret the 
technical decision of a body of experts that is rational in the sense that it is adopted in line 
with applicable theoretical models and empirical evidence and hold that the decision has a 
different effect than the one it professes to have. This is particularly problematic if the 
court does not discuss the scientific arguments supporting, and those casting doubt on, the 
rationale of the decision, but merely refers to one view and the “convincing expertise” of 
the institution expressing that view, which was in this case, incidentally, also the institution 
providing the one dissenting vote when the Governing Council of the ECB adopted the 
challenged decision. The fact that the dissenting institution itself bought its sovereign’s 
bonds in significant volumes to keep interest rates low–i.e. for monetary policy reasons–
during the 1970s,
81
 can hardly be said to strengthen the force of that institution’s 
submission. 
 
To be sure, this is not, at least not necessarily, a technocratic argument against the 
Constitutional Court—or indeed the highest court of any other country—reviewing 
important and potentially problematic decisions taken by the ECB on the basis that “the 
experts know best.” It is worth remembering here, however, that the Constitutional Court 
goes far beyond this: rather than reaching the conclusion that a particular implementation 
of OMT is or would be incompatible with the Treaty (and German law), it seems to assume 
that it is able to identify definitively the one and only scenario that is compatible with it.
82
 
                                            
77 ECB, MONTHLY BULLETIN 7 (Sep. 2012). 
78 OMT Ruling at para. 71; para. 98 (“[T]he distinction between rational and irrational is meaningless”). 
79 See De Grauwe & Ji, supra note 28 (calculating the part of the surge in spreads of peripheral Eurozone countries 
that was disconnected from underlying increases in the debt to GDP ratios and fiscal space variables and arguing 
that this part was associated with negative self-fulfilling market sentiments); Tigran Poghosyan, Long-Run and 
Short-Run Determinants of Sovereign Bond Yields in Advanced Economies, IMF WORKING PAPER 12/271 (2012) 
(arguing that “that spreads against Germany in some European periphery countries exceeded the level 
determined by fundamentals in the aftermath of the crisis, while some North European countries have benefited 
from ‘safe haven’ flows”). 
80 See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000). 
81 See Christoph Herrmann, EZB-Programm für die Kapitalmärkte verstößt nicht gegen die Verträge, 21 
EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (EUZW) 645, 646 (2010); Christoph Herrmann, Die Bewältigung der 
Euro-Staatsschulden-Krise an den Grenzen des deutschen und europäischen Währungsverfassungsrechts, 23 
EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (EUZW) 805, 811 (2012). 
82 OMT Ruling at para. 100. 
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The second part of the Constitutional Court’s argument—namely that safeguarding the 
current composition of the euro currency area “is obviously not a task of monetary 
policy”—is based on an equally peculiar understanding of what the ECB intends to achieve 
with the OMT Decision. The Court applies Articles 139 and 140 TFEU to the case in order to 
hold that the OMT Decision does not fall within the mandate of the ECB. These two articles 
deal with the transition to monetary union and the criteria that a Member State must fulfill 
in order to be eligible to join the Eurozone (convergence criteria). They set out a procedure 
for the assessment of the convergence criteria and accord the Council and Commission the 
main role in this procedure. It is not clear what this has to do with the case at hand.
83
 
Articles 139 and 140 TFEU concern the introduction of the euro; once a currency has been 
introduced, it is evident that it falls within the mandate of the central bank to protect it. 
This applies to the ECB as much as it does to any other central bank in the world.
84
 As 
discussed above, crisis prevention and intervention by central banks are in line with the 
goal of monetary policy as set out in Article 127(1) TFEU if they are designed to address 
threats to price stability.
85
 The relevant question is not so much whether the central bank 
acts within its monetary policy mandate when it counteracts distortions in financial 
markets but rather what types of instruments it can make use of within its mandate. The 
ECB’s monetary policy instruments are laid down in the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and of the ECB.
86
 Pursuant to the Statute, the ECB has three types of 




 and minimum 
                                            
83 The Constitutional Court seems to believe that the allocation of competences in Articles 139 and 140 TFEU 
apply generally to any question concerning the “composition of the euro currency area.” OMT Ruling at para. 72. 
The Court also refers to a press release of the ECB in which it allegedly claimed that the OMT Decision served to 
safeguard the current composition of the Eurozone. This press release—ECB Press Release of 26 July 2012—could 
not be retrieved by the authors. Possibly the Court means the speech by Mario Draghi given in London on 26 July 
2012, in which he famously said that “the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro,” but where 
he did not mention the composition of the euro area. Mario Draghi, President, European Cent. Bank, Global Inv. 
Conference in London (July 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). He also said 
on this and other occasions that it was the aim of the ECB to make the euro “irreversible.” Id. These statements 
were aimed at reassuring investors that the common currency would not disintegrate. They are, therefore, better 
understood as comments regarding financial stability concerns than the composition of the Eurozone. 
84 See, for example, the original version of the German Bundesbank law establishing the central bank, supra note 
52. “The German Bundesbank shall regulate, by exercising the powers in the field of monetary policy conferred on 
it by this law, the circulation of money and the supply of credit to the economy with the aim of protecting the 
currency . . . .” Id. 
85 See supra text accompanying notes 59–63. 
86 See supra note 50. 
87 Id. art. 18.1. 
88 Id. 
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reserve requirements.
89
 Under the OMT Decision, the ECB envisages purchasing 
government bonds in the secondary market. OMTs may, therefore, fall within the 
definition of open market operations given in the Statute.
90
 Whether they are indeed 
comparable to these monetary policy instruments, or rather to economic policy 
instruments such as the ESM, depends on their technical features. We turn to this question 
next. 
 
2.2 Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions  
 
The second set of arguments put forward by the Constitutional Court in relation to an 
infringement of Article 127
91
 concern the technical features of OMTs: The selectivity of the 
bond purchases, targeting specific Member States participating in an EFSF/ESM assistance 
program, and the parallelism with the European Financial Stability Facility or European 
Stability Mechanism. 
 
As far as the selectivity of the announced bond purchases is concerned, the Constitutional 
Court explicitly recognizes a central problem of its position—namely that any form of 
monetary policy, including setting uniform short-term interest rates for the entire 
Eurozone, affects the countries within the Eurozone very differently, hence calling into 
question any interpretation of “independence” as requiring equivalent effects. But it 
brushes away this complication by, it seems, drawing a line between formal equal 
treatment (one interest rate for all countries) and equal effects (same interest rate is 
suitable for some, and damaging for other countries). Because mere differences in effect 
are indirect and “can be controlled by the [ESCB] only to a limited degree,” such monetary 
measures are to be distinguished from the OMT Programme, which “envisages a targeted 
purchase of government bonds of selected Member States,” resulting in the “government 




The argument does not seem particularly convincing to us. First, had the ECB announced 
its willingness to buy any sovereign Eurozone bond at yields of, say, 5%, would that satisfy 
the formal equivalent treatment requirement? Clearly, the effect would not have been 
very similar, especially in relation to the “bonds of other Member States” the 
Constitutional Court refers to. Second, the Constitutional Court seems to take issue with 
                                            
89 Id. art. 19. 
90 Pursuant to Article 18.1 of the Statute, the ECB and the national central banks may “operate in the financial 
markets by buying and selling outright (spot and forward) or under repurchase agreement and by lending or 
borrowing claims and marketable instruments . . . .” ESCB Statute, supra note 50, art 18.1.  
91 The same arguments are used to substantiate a violation of Article 123 TFEU. See OMT Ruling at para. 87 and 
our analysis infra part D.II.  
92 Id. 
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differentiation between individual Member States by the ECB, at least where this is the 
result of “targeted” action. Even if one were to ignore the fact that any rate setting is at 
least implicitly targeted—because the Council will look at and weigh the likely effects of its 
measures on different countries against each other
93
—whether or not selective buying 
does in fact represent differentiation of the sort that calls into question the central bank’s 
independence is very much a matter of one’s viewpoint. 
  
While the OMT Decision does involve targeted and selective buying of bonds, it is also a 
policy based on objective and relevant criteria. Any Eurozone country meeting the 
conditions of the ECB’s policy could potentially benefit from the OMT Programme. 
Moreover, the fact that changing market conditions may result in other Member States 
“eventually [being] placed at a disadvantage” does not seem to have a more direct 
consequence than, for instance, forgone economic output due to a uniform monetary 
policy that is predictably unsuitable for certain countries in the Eurozone. 
 
It seems to us that relevant and meaningful doubts regarding the ECB’s independence 
would only exist if there was any indication of the ECB treating different countries’ bonds 
differently despite the countries being in the same circumstances. In fact, the reverse is 
equally true—treating countries equally despite relevant differences in their economic 
situations would be as problematic from an independence point of view as unequal 
treatment of like cases. Of course, this is not to say that the ECB can justify any selective 
and targeted market intervention by pointing to different conditions. The point is simply 
that market interventions by the ECB based on relevant and objective criteria are neither 
rendered more nor less likely to constitute prohibited monetary financing by the fact that 
they involve transactions in only some, rather than all, sovereign bond markets. Instead, 
whether or not ECB intervention constitutes monetary financing depends on the criteria 
used for targeting its actions, the aims pursued, and the likely effects of such actions, in 
particular, whether the effect can in economic terms be described as an extension of credit 
by the ECB to national governments. Given what we said above, the decisive requirements 
for a permissible use of OMTs will be that bond buying, if it happens at all, occurs at 
equilibrium rates and is used only to prevent bad equilibria from arising. 
 
Furthermore, according to the Constitutional Court, a violation of the Treaty is also 
indicated by its running in parallel with the EFSF and ESM assistance programs.
94
 In 
particular, the Constitutional Court argues that the ECB’s OMT approach is “likely to bypass 
the conditions and conditionalities” of the EFSF and the ESM. The Constitutional Court 
                                            
93 In fact, the ECB’s inability to target its monetary policy, combined with a lack of fiscal coordination, can create 
moral hazard among Member States, as fiscal responsibility may be a sub-optimal strategy depending on the 
behavior of other Member States; see Bob Hancké, The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy in EMU, 1 EUR. POL. ECON. 
REV. 1 (2003) (analyzing the adoption of low inflation policies as a collective action problem for Member States). 
94 See OMT Ruling at para. 87. 
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points to the fact that secondary market purchases are also envisaged by the ESM Treaty.
95
 
Under the ESM Treaty, however, secondary market operations are only permissible in the 
case of “exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability” and 
“stricter conditionality” exists than envisaged by the OMT Programme. The main problem 
with this seems to be that it results in purchases under OMT to be possible in a wider 
scope of circumstances than under the ESM Treaty, thus resulting in the “bypassing” of the 
latter facility. Moreover, not only are the conditions for OMT laxer than for ESM 
intervention, but—as the ECJ has held in Pringle
96
—the ESM clearly constitutes economic 
policy.
97
 In the view of the Constitutional Court, this shows that the OMT Programme 
necessarily is an instrument of economic policy, a conclusion it sees confirmed by the fact 
that the OMT Decision explicitly emphasizes its conditionality, including the ECB’s intention 
to terminate the program in case of non-compliance with the relevant adjustment 
program. 
 
It follows, in the view of the Constitutional Court, that OMT is “the functional equivalent to 
an assistance measure of the above-mentioned institutions.”
98
 Here, the Constitutional 
Court seems to derive from the fact that both the general conditions and the instruments 
run, somewhat, in parallel that the two mechanisms are ultimately equivalent in function.  
 
It is correct that a program such as the one described in the OMT Decision could be used to 
bypass, complement, or substitute the ESM mechanism. If, for instance, the OMT were 
used to neutralize bond spreads, this would not only result in de facto monetary financing 
of European sovereigns, but would also undermine the ESM. It does not follow, however, 
that any implementation of OMT is functionally equivalent in this way; neither does it 
follow that only a program limited in the way the Constitutional Court demands in 
paragraph 100 of its judgment is. The crucial question in this context concerns both the 
pricing conditions for ESM loans—and other Financial Support Instruments under the ESM 




 sovereign borrowers can be subject to multiple equilibria in the 
sense that more than one interest rate can be justified in market terms for a particular 
economic scenario the country is in. Apart from a “good” equilibrium with relatively low, 
sustainable interest rates and default probability, a “bad” and unstable equilibrium may 
exist with higher rates and resulting higher default probability. The latter equilibrium is 
                                            
95 See ESM Treaty art. 18(2). 
96 See Pringle, supra note 1. 
97 See OMT Ruling at para. 76. 
98 Id. 
99 See supra Part C.II.  
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unstable because minor deviations in market conditions and investor sentiment can trigger 
the country to enter the “default equilibrium,” for example in a situation where default is 




Now let us assume that the ECB’s policy regarding the OMT is simply to create a “firewall” 
intended to avoid or revert the bad equilibrium. In order to do so, it would have to credibly 
alter the expectations of investors as to the possibility of entering the default equilibrium. 
Crucially, as long as the intervention is restricted to preventing a country from entering a 
bad equilibrium, this does not amount to a transfer of wealth to the country in whose 
bonds intervention is being promised. This is due to the fact that in a good equilibrium, 
investors are already fully compensated for the default risk of the sovereign issuer in 
question. Given the avoidance of the bad equilibrium, the “put option” promised by the 
ECB has no value for investors beyond having changed expectations so as to bring the 
country into that equilibrium.  
 
As discussed, actions by the ECB, as well as statements by Mario Draghi,
101
 lend strong 
support to the notion that this is in fact the intention behind OMT. In that case, we would 
also expect the ECB to accept positive bond spreads across different countries, reflecting 
their respective “good equilibria”—as the default probabilities will differ across countries, 
so will the interest rates in the good equilibrium.  
 
For this to be an adequate description of OMT, it is a necessary but insufficient condition 
that the ECB does not actually have to make good on its promise, at least not beyond the 
point where it makes its commitment credible. If the aim is to push the market to an 
equilibrium, the fact that the ECB actually does have to intervene in the market would 
strongly suggest that it has failed to meet its target, as in equilibrium the market interest 
rate is both sustainable and adequate from the investors’ perspective.  
 
In this case, OMT would in effect simply address a market failure; this does not mean, as 
suggested by the Constitutional Court, declaring “irrational” a certain portion of a 
country’s bond yield.
102
 In fact, self-fulfilling crises of this sort do not involve irrational 
behavior by the economic actors individually, as pointed out above. Instead, like in the 
case of a “sunspot” bank run
103
 on a solvent bank, the “irrationality” is the failure of the 
market to produce a better state of the world that leaves everyone better off. In that 
                                            
100 See the literature cited supra note 39. 
101 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
102 See OMT Ruling at para. 98. 
103 See e.g. Mark M. Spiegel, Solvency Runs, Sunspot Runs, and International Bailouts, 65 J. OF INT’L ECON. 203 
(2005). 
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sense, the market as a whole can be regarded as irrational, or suffering from a lack of 
coordination, for failing to produce the right outcome.  
 
This also tells us something about the alleged functional equivalence between the OMT 
Programme and the ESM. Financial Support by the ESM clearly is not intended to only 
bring about good equilibria. This is evidenced by the financing conditions for ESM support. 
According to Article 20 of the ESM Treaty, the “ESM shall aim to fully cover its financing 
and operating costs.”
104
 This is reflected in the ESM’s pricing policy. The interest rate for 
financial support by the ESM is calculated in accordance with the pricing policy described in 
the relevant guideline.
105
 The interest rate charged to Member States consists of four main 
elements: 
 
1. The base rate, essentially representing the ESM’s refinancing costs 
which are passed through to the sovereign borrowers; 
2. A Commitment Fee, in effect compensating the ESM for the fact that 
it plays “reverse bank”—also issuing long-term bonds, which it 
invests in low-yielding short term assets until support is actually 
needed and drawn by participant Member States. 
3. A Service Fee which covers ESM operational costs, as well as other 
direct costs and fees the ESM incurs. 
4. An “appropriate margin”
106
 charged to the Member State. 
Depending on the Financial Support Instrument, this margin lies 




In short, financial support by the ESM is available at the interest rate the ESM has to pay to 
finance itself, plus costs and expenses, plus a margin of five to thirty-five bps. Upon its 
inaugural issuance of a long-term bond in October 2013, the ESM had to offer a yield of 
1.288%.
108
 For comparison, Italy issued bonds of the same maturity in October 2013 at a 
yield of 2.89%,
109
 which was seen as a considerable success at the time. Early this year, 
                                            
104 ESM Treaty art. 20. 
105 See EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM, ESM PRICING POLICY (2012), available at 
http://esm.europa.eu/pdf/Pricing%20guideline.pdf. 
106 ESM Treaty art. 20. 
107 See EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM, supra note 105, at 7. 
108 See Press Release, European Stability Mechanism, ESM Issues Inaugural Long-Term Bond (Oct. 8, 2013), 
available at http://www.esm.europa.eu/press/releases/esm-issues-inaugural-long-term-bond.htm. 
109 See Lukanyo Mnyanda, Italian Bonds Rise as Five-Year Borrowing Costs Fall at Auction, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 30, 
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-30/italian-bonds-advance-after-borrowing-costs-fall-at-debt-
auction.html. 
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Portugal issued bonds of the same maturity at 4.657%, again viewed as a vote of 
confidence of the market.
110
 In other words, the ESM facilities do, indeed, seek to partly 
“neutralize” the spreads in borrowing costs between Member States; as argued above, the 
OMT does not. This also weakens substantially arguments the Constitutional Court wants 
to derive from Pringle. 
  
It follows in our view that viewing the ESM and the OMT Programme as functionally 
equivalent is misguided. ESM loans and other support available from the ESM are provided 
to Member States at rates and conditions that very clearly do not reflect the market view 
of an adequate risk premium, given the perceived default risk of the beneficiary countries. 
The ESM thus constitutes economic policy, as held in Pringle, because it is obvious that it in 
effect involves a wealth transfer to beneficiary countries. The solvency of the ESM is higher 
than that of the beneficiary countries, and it—and the “strong” countries behind it—
pledge this higher solvency for the benefit of the recipient Member States. 
 
As stated above, much the same could in theory be achieved through OMT, but this would 
require a similar disconnect between equilibrium market rates and the ECB’s “trigger 
price”, i.e. the price at which it is prepared to start its intervention. In our view, there is no 
evidence that it was intended for OMT to be used in this way. Moreover, strict adherence 
to the Constitutional Court’s description of a Treaty-compatible implementation of OMT 
may be a sufficient, but it is hardly a necessary condition for avoiding the “bypassing” 
problem the Court seeks to address. 
 
It thus seems misguided to claim that OMT purchases replicate or substitute ESM support 
facilities. The parallelism in the conditionalities of the two mechanisms does not alter this 
conclusion. Even if the conditions for making the two mechanisms available run in parallel, 
the conditions can be seen as pursuing different aims. In a wealth transfer scenario, the 
ESM conditionality seeks to ensure that fiscal discipline results in a sustainable budgetary 
position, where reliance on refinancing at market (equilibrium) rates becomes sustainable 
in the future. In the case of an OMT Programme seeking only to avert bad equilibria, 
conditionality seeks to ensure that current financing conditions remain in equilibrium.  
 
In conclusion, we submit that it is more convincing to liken OMTs to the monetary policy 
instruments listed in Article 18.1 of the ESCB Statute, rather than to the ESM or other 
instruments of economic policy. At the very least, there exists a range of possible 
implementations of OMT that should not raise these concerns. 
 
  
                                            
110 See Peter Wise, Portugal Enjoys Strong Demand in Debt Sale, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9b47af68-791a-11e3-b381-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2v17AUrMP.  
3 1 0  G e r m a n  L a w  J o u r n a l   [Vol. 15 No. 02 
2.3 Support of the Economic Policies in the Union 
 
As we have seen, there are good reasons to conclude that OMTs are covered by the ECB’s 
monetary policy mandate. Even if this was not the case, the ECB would be competent to 
take actions falling outside of monetary policy to “support the general economic policies in 
the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union”, provided that the ECB’s primary 
objective of price stability is not compromised.
111
 The TFEU does not define what “support 
of the general economic policies in the Union” means. It may be useful to distinguish 
between two points. First, the article refers to the economic policies “in the Union,” not 
“of the Union.” It therefore encompasses not only the limited areas where the Union has 
competences in economic policy, but also actions taken by the Member States in the field 
of economic policy with a view to achieving the objectives of the Union.
112
 The objectives 
that are relevant in this context include, pursuant to Article 3 TEU, the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a 
competitive social market economy, economic and social cohesion, and the establishment 
of a monetary union. It therefore seems to be clear that actions of the ECB aimed at 
preserving the common currency, addressing severe distortions in the financial markets, 
and mitigating to some extent the economic and social consequences of deflationary 
pressures in some Member States are related to the objectives laid down in Article 3 TEU. 
 
The second, and more problematic, question is whether OMTs can be qualified as 
“supporting” the relevant economic policies of the Member States. The Constitutional 
Court answers this question in the negative for two reasons. The OMTs were potentially of 
such magnitude that the volume of the assistance measures agreed under the European 
Stability Mechanism “could de facto be considerably broadened, and potentially even 
multiplied, through parallel purchases of government bonds by the Eurosystem.”
113
 In 
addition, due to its position, the ECB must act independently in deciding on the start and 
duration of outright monetary transactions. This is, in fact, how the ECB explains it will 
implement the OMT Decision.
114
 However, if the ECB’s action requires an independent 
economic assessment and does not merely “retrace” the decisions of the institutions 
responsible for deciding on assistance measures under the ESM or comparable programs, 
it goes, in the opinion of the Constitutional Court, beyond what could still be qualified as 
                                            
111 TFEU art. 127(1); ESCB Statute, supra note 50, art. 2.  
112 See Ulrich Häde, in EUV/AEUV Article 127 TFEU, para. 5 (Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert eds., 4th ed. 
2011).  
113 OMT Ruling at para. 81. 
114 The decision states that the “Governing Council will decide on the start, continuation and suspension of 
Outright Monetary Transactions in full discretion and acting in accordance with its monetary policy mandate.” Id. 
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“support” of economic policy.
115
 Thus, the Court’s argument rests on two legs, a 
quantitative and a qualitative one. It will be argued that both are unconvincing. 
 
As far as the qualitative leg is concerned, a requirement that the support of economic 
policy requires the exclusion of any independent economic assessment cannot be derived 
from the Treaty or the ordinary meaning of the word “support.” The narrow interpretation 
of the Constitutional Court would also render Article 127(1) TFEU all but contradictory. The 
Constitutional Court juxtaposes the independence of the ECB as enshrined in Article 130 
TFEU with the supposed incompatibility of an independent economic assessment and the 
meaning of “support.”
116
 Obviously the Treaty cannot on the one hand have required an 
independent ECB to support the general economic policies in the Union and on the other 
hand intended the word “support” to be interpreted as excluding any activity that involves 
an independent economic assessment. 
 
As far as the quantitative leg is concerned, two points can be made. First, as explained 
above, the rationale of the OMT Decision is that it allows for ex ante unlimited purchases 
of government bonds. The actual purchases will, however, always be limited and will often 
be equal to zero. The ECB only intends to purchase, and is possibly only competent to 
purchase within its mandate, the amount necessary to change the expectations leading to 
a bad equilibrium and restore a good equilibrium.117 The Constitutional Court’s argument 
seems to be based on a different understanding of the operation of the OMT Decision. 
Second, by pointing out that OMTs could potentially multiply the volume of assistance 
provided under the ESM, the Constitutional Court implicitly assumes that the right point of 
reference to measure whether support has been given are the decisions of the Member 
States that have led to the establishment of the ESM. However, it is not clear why the ESM 
should be the economic policy measure that is used as a comparator. It is more convincing 
to hold that the OMT Decision supports the functioning of the economic and monetary 
union as such, which would, arguably, have faced severe detrimental economic 
consequences if the common currency had disintegrated. Through this lens, it is difficult to 
argue that OMTs were actually or potentially of such a volume that they went beyond a 
mere supporting measure. 
 
Consequently, it is by no means evident that the OMT Decision exceeds what can be 
qualified as support of the general economic policies in the Union. If this is correct, it is 
doubtful that the challenged act constitutes a transgression of the ECB’s mandate that 
                                            
115 See OMT Ruling at para. 82. 
116 Id. 
117 See supra text to notes 73–76 and 97–102. 
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II. Prohibition on Monetary Financing 
 
The Constitutional Court further argues that the OMT Decision is also “likely to violate”
119
 
Article 123(1) of the TFEU.
120
 The provision prohibits overdraft facilities or other credit 
facilities provided by the ECB to national governments, EU institutions, and other public 
bodies.
121
 The prohibition also includes any primary market purchase
122
 of sovereign bonds 
by the ECB as well as by national central banks. Secondary market purchases
123
 of 
government debt instruments by the ECB, on the other hand, are not illegal per se.
124
 As 
argued by the Constitutional Court, Article 123 TFEU is to be interpreted widely and in 
particular also applies to any circumvention of this prohibition.
125
 In its submission, the ECB 




It is undoubtedly correct that secondary market purchases by the ECB can in theory be 
used to effectively render Article 123 TFEU meaningless. Were the ECB to—credibly and 
unconditionally—commit to offer buying any or all newly issued government bonds of a 
particular sovereign issuer the day after they are issued to private investors, and were it to 
also announce the price (yield) at which such purchases will happen, investors would have 
to view the purchase of such bonds as equivalent to an overnight deposit with the ECB. 
  
                                            
118 On this standard of review see OMT Ruling at paras. 24, 37–38 and Part A above. 
119 Id. at para 84 (translating from “dürfte . . . ebenfalls verstoßen”). 
120 See OMT Ruling at paras. 84–94. 
121 See also ESCB Statute, supra note 50, art. 21(1). 
122 i.e. purchases directly from the issuer, and thus transactions where the price paid for the purchase of the debt 
instrument directly flows to the issuer (i.e. the sovereign debtor). This prohibition is explicitly made in Article 123 
TFEU, although primary market purchases are clearly caught by the general prohibition of any “credit facility.” 
123 i.e. purchases of such securities from bond holders after the issuance by the sovereign. Obviously, in such 
secondary market transactions, any purchase price paid by the ECB—or any other purchaser—flows to the seller 
of the bond, with no immediate impact on the credit position of the initial issuer. 
124 The notion that secondary market purchases are in principle permissible has not been seriously questioned. 
See also ESCB Statute, supra note 50, art. 18 (providing explicitly for these transactions). 
125 See also Council Regulation 3603/93, pmbl., 1993 O.J. (L 332) (EC) (“In particular, purchases made on the 
secondary market must not be used to circumvent the objective of that Article.”). 
126 See ECB submission, http://www.handelsblatt.com/downloads/8135244/3/EZB%20Gutachten, 16–17. 
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This of course depends on the sovereign in question actually issuing bonds at the 
announced ECB purchase price (or below).
127
 If, say, the ECB were to credibly commit to 
buying any German ten-year sovereign bond at an implied yield of 10% p.a. the day after 
such bonds are issued, investors would have little reason to pay any attention to this 
announcement. Because Germany will issue bonds at a higher price (lower yield), the 
ability to sell the asset at a loss immediately after having purchased it is in effect worthless. 
If, however, the announced ECB purchase price exceeds what the market thinks is justified 
in light of the country’s default risk, the ECB’s promise would constitute an economically 
valuable option to sell to a solvent counterparty. In this case, the yield at which the 
government in question can issue bonds would necessarily have to equal the yield implied 
in the ECB’s purchase promise.  
 
In economic terms, the situation would be indistinguishable from a direct monetary 
financing of the national government in question by the ECB. While investors are the 
formal owners of the bonds they purchase, all associated risks would effectively be borne 
by the Euro system, and bond yields would have to be regarded as centrally and 
unilaterally determined by the ECB. It can convincingly be argued that ECB intervention in 
the markets of that kind would constitute the very sort of monetary financing that Article 
123 TFEU outlaws, and that a sensible interpretation of the provision has to take this into 
account by extending the prohibition to certain secondary market purchases. 
 
Having established that Article 123 TFEU also applies to certain types of open market 
operations by the central bank, the Constitutional Court argues that the OMT Decision 
(likely) violates this wide understanding of the monetary financing prohibition. The 
Constitutional Court first states that its doubts in relation to: (1) the neutralization of 
interest rate spreads, (2) the selectivity of purchases, and (3) the risk of OMT running in 
parallel—and perhaps undermining—the EFSF and ESM
128
 call into question the legality of 
OMT in light of Article 123 TFEU. It then adds four additional aspects of the program which 
“at least when taken together”
129
 also suggest that the OMT Decision violates Article 123 
TFEU. These additional aspects are (4) the lack of a preferred creditor status of the ECB in 
relation to the bonds purchased and the increased risk of a sovereign default of the 
Eurozone countries in question;
130
 (5) the general possibility for the ECB to hold the 
purchased government bonds to maturity; (6) the interference with market price 




                                            
127 Minus the negligible discount for overnight deposits. 
128 See supra Part D.I.  
129 OMT Ruling at para. 87. 
130 Id. The Constitutional Court treats this aspect as two distinct points, but clearly they are inseparable. 
131 The latter two points are also best treated together. See infra Part D.II.4. 
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We have addressed points (2) and (3) above.
132
 The arguments advanced there apply 
equally to a possible violation of Article 123 TFEU. The remaining points will be dealt with 
in turn below. In short, we will argue that the Constitutional Court is correct in so far as it 
identifies a number of possible breaches of Article 123 TFEU, which could result from 
particular forms of the OMT Decision’s implementation. At the same time, however, the 
Constitutional Court ignores—or at least addresses incompletely
133
—the circumstances in 
which OMTs do not violate Article 123. Based on an extended range of possible OMT-
implementations compatible with the Treaty, we conclude that there exists no indication 
that the ECB does in fact intend to implement OMT contrary to the Treaty. 
 
1. Neutralization of Interest Rate Spreads 
 
The Constitutional Court points out
134
 that the existence of interest rate spreads “is 
entirely intended” by the Treaty and exists by design. By attempting to “neutralize” these 
spreads, the ECB not only oversteps its mandate,
135
 but in the view of the Constitutional 
Court also violates the prohibition on monetary financing. 
 
The Constitutional Court’s argument is of course a valid one. To the extent that the market 
perceives different Eurozone countries to represent different default risks—which is 
undoubtedly true—the persistence of interest rate spreads is a natural consequence of the 
fundamental differences in countries’ solvency, including within a monetary union of the 
Eurozone-type. The existence of such yields ultimately is an expression of Article 123 TFEU 
being regarded as effective and binding by the market.
136
 In the absence of monetary 
financing by the central bank, investors holding sovereign bonds will assume that they bear 
the economic risk of a sovereign default and will “charge interest” accordingly. 
 
Thus, a neutralization of bond spreads in the form of a single Eurozone sovereign bond 
yield—e.g., Greek and German bonds trading at the same price—brought about by the ECB 
is a sufficient condition for finding a violation of Article 123 TFEU. It is unclear, however, 
why the Constitutional Court would assume that this type of “neutralization” is the 
intention behind OMT. As is plainly clear from Figure I above, significant interest rate 
spreads still exist across different Eurozone countries. The ECB has not put into action the 
OMT Programme, presumably because its mere announcement has already produced the 
                                            
132 See supra Part D.I.2.2 
133 See, e.g., OMT Ruling at para. 100. 
134 See OMT Ruling at para 71. 
135 See supra notes 65–79 and accompanying text. 
136 Or, at least, as long as no other mutualization of debts are expected by the market. 
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desired effects.
137
 Unless one assumes that the ECB holds back action for reasons other 
than that implementing OMT is unnecessary under current market conditions, any 
assertion about a violation of Article 123 by the ECB based on the “neutralization 
argument” seems very weak indeed. 
  
In fact, the acceptance by the ECB of significant risk premia for holding, say, Portuguese 
bonds, compared to German, Spanish and Italian bonds, very strongly suggests that it does 
not want to eliminate market incentives for national budgetary responsibility. Thus, the 
Constitutional Court’s argument is perfectly valid, but does not necessarily apply in relation 
to the ECB’s OMT Decision.  
 
This is, admittedly, not a knockout argument. It would clearly be possible for the ECB to 
provide differential, but economically unjustified “put options” to holders of different 
countries’ bonds, i.e. maintain bond spreads while still depressing yields to artificially low 
levels. 
 
As a matter of fact, however, there is no indication of the ECB intending to do just that. 
Both market interest rates and the actions by the ECB are compatible with an 
interpretation of the OMT Programme as a way to “push” the market into a good and 
stable equilibrium.
138
 There is also empirical support for the existence of potential bad 
equilibria in the European sovereign debt markets.
139
 Furthermore, the ECB’s president has 




2. Pari Passu 
 
Another point which, in the view of the Constitutional Court, suggests that purchases on 
the basis of the OMT Decision constitute illegal monetary financing is the failure of the ECB 
to maintain a “preferred creditor status,” i.e., the decision to accept that the ECB will rank 
pari passu with other creditors in relation to bonds actually purchased.
141
 This includes, in 
case of a sovereign default, the participation in a haircut on debt owed by the defaulting 
country, which in the Constitutional Court’s opinion “is not likely to be compatible with 
Article 123 TFEU.” At least where the bonds acquired “contai[n], from the outset, the 
prospect of subsequently becoming part of a potential debt cut,” the waiving of the 
repayment obligation and an outright advancement of funds without any repayment 
                                            
137 See the references supra note 4. 
138 See supra Part D.I.2.2. 
139 See e.g., Gärtner & Griesbach, supra note 39; De Grauwe & Ji, supra note 28. 
140 See supra note 76. 
141 See OMT Ruling at para 88. 
3 1 6  G e r m a n  L a w  J o u r n a l   [Vol. 15 No. 02 
obligation are essentially indistinguishable, and equally incompatible with Article 123 
TFEU. If our view of the OMT Programme as a firewall against bad equilibria is correct, 
these arguments are ultimately not convincing. 
  
Undoubtedly, the acquisition of bonds at a price that is unjustifiably high given the ex ante 
risk of default can constitute monetary financing.
142
 This holds true irrespective of an 
actual or foreseeable default. As long as the ECB does not intend to purchase sovereign 
bonds at a price exceeding the equilibrium market price, however, this scenario does not 
seem relevant. Indeed, any purchase of securities contains from the outset the possibility 
of a loss; the question is whether the likelihood of a default is sufficiently small, given the 
price paid. Unless one calls into question any secondary market purchase of government 
securities by the ECB—as pari passu creditor—it has to be accepted that the ECB can in 
principle assume risk. The ECB would very likely exceed its mandate, were it to acquire 
government bonds it knows to turn into a loss. The reason for this is not, however, that it 
cannot or should not assume risk, but that bonds that are certain to default cannot be sold 
to an investor at any price.  
 
Moreover, it is unclear to us how demanding a “preferred creditor status” would safeguard 
the interests of other Member States. By demanding a preferred creditor status the OMT 
Programme would, in our view, be more likely to leave the realm of monetary policy. This 
is because the likely impact on market prices and the risk of a decoupling between 
economic fundamentals and market prices would in fact be increased. By purchasing bonds 
as a preferred creditor, the ECB would in effect increase the equilibrium yield for the bonds 
it purchases because any possible future haircut for private investors would have to be 
higher to achieve the same outcome. For that reason, demanding a preferred creditor 
status would likely create, rather than prevent, market failures. By the same token, it 
would also vastly increase the risk of actual intervention becoming necessary. Similarly, 
requiring the ECB not to participate in a haircut would call into question the very monetary 
policy reasons the Constitutional Court finds lacking, as purchases—actual purchases as 
they then would likely be—by a preferred creditor ECB are unlikely to affect the monetary 
transmission mechanism, which the ECB argues was the main driver behind the OMT 
Decision. 
 
Demanding, as the Constitutional Court does in paragraph 100 of its ruling, an 
interpretation of the OMT Decision that requires the ECB to obtain a preferred creditor 
status does not therefore solve the problem of compatibility with Article 123 TFEU. It 
would, however, likely create the risk of actual bond purchases being rendered necessary 
and would in effect defeat the purpose of OMT. 
 
  
                                            
142 See supra Part D.II.1. 
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3. Holding Government Bonds to Maturity under OMT 
 
The Constitutional Court further holds that the possibility of the ECB holding bonds until 
maturity casts additional doubts on the OMT Decision’s compatibility with the TFEU. The 
Constitutional Court claims that holding bonds to maturity prevents a market-based price 
determination for these bonds, “if a substantial amount of the government bonds issued 
by selected Member States is permanently removed from the market.” This would 




It is unclear which mechanism the Constitutional Court has in mind here. It is of course 
theoretically possible, if unlikely in practice, that the ECB acquires virtually all outstanding 
bonds of a Member State, and that the reduced liquidity would lead to less efficient price 
formation in the market. However, since the OMT Decision makes clear that only short-
term debt will be subject to the OMT Programme, other bonds would still provide the 
necessary price feedback the Constitutional Court seems to demand. Furthermore, even if 
the argument were valid, requiring the ECB to sell bonds before maturity would not change 
anything: Bonds sold shortly before maturity to investors who are assured of the ECB’s 
continued buying of bonds—as the Constitutional Court must assume—would hardly result 
in what the Constitutional Court could call a disciplining market price. Even more 
problematic, the Constitutional Court suggests that government bonds are subject to laws 
of supply and demand in a way where a “shortage of the supply of bonds circulating on the 
secondary market”
144
 has the effect of monetary financing of state budgets. This suggests 
that the Constitutional Court assumes that the mere fact that there is a shortage of bonds 
in circulation would increase their price—presumable due to their rarity; here the 
Constitutional Court seems to invoke a wilder version of market irrationality than the one 
it assumed away a few paragraphs later.
145
 Sovereign bonds represent claims to cash flows; 
investors are not collectors of bonds—they will not price them according to their rarity, 
but according to the risks and returns they pose in relation to other investments. The 
rationales behind demanding a resale of the bonds before maturity for reasons of 
compliance with Article 123 are thus obscure at best. However, unlike the demand for a 
preferred creditor status, this requirement—if simply requiring the ECB to sell bonds 




                                            
143 OMT Ruling at para. 90. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at para. 98. 
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4. Interference with Market Price Formation and “Encouragement” of Private Bond 
Purchases 
 
The Constitutional Court also holds that OMT’s incompatibility with Article 123 TFEU is 
further indicated by the fact that government bonds could be purchased shortly after 
emission. Similarly, an announcement of “imminent purchases” prior to a new emission of 
bonds would encourage investors to purchase bonds in the primary market solely because 





 to the extent that purchases happen or are—explicitly or implicitly—
promised to be made at artificially high prices, the argument is of course correct. However, 
to the extent that the market expects the ECB to buy bonds at such artificially high prices, 
the timing of such purchases is of little consequence. Only highly inefficient—and 
irrational—markets could be assumed to price government bonds according to 
fundamentals upon issue, despite expecting later secondary market purchases by the ECB 
at a price higher than fundamentally justified. Accordingly, these two objections are from 
our perspective similar to the preferred creditor status: They are ultimately unconvincing, 
but implementing or altering the OMT Decision to take them into account would not 




The above analysis suggests that the program announced by the OMT Decision, 
interpreted in light of its likely economic rationale and mode of operation as envisaged by 
the ECB, falls within the monetary policy framework drawn by the Treaty. This is true for a 
range of possible implementations by the ECB, including the most likely course of action 
given OMT’s economic rationale. Importantly, it is in our view unnecessary to deviate in 
any fundamental way from the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the Treaty (or of 
German constitutional law) in order to reach this conclusion; rather, it suffices to re-
characterize the economic rationale behind the OMT Programme to identify additional 
scenarios in which the ECB is neither limited in the way envisaged by paragraph 100 of the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling, nor breaches the relevant Treaty provisions. Based on the 
economic rationale discussed above and the expressed intentions of the ECB, these also 
happen to be the most likely scenarios for ECB action.  
 
The Constitutional Court is certainly right when emphasizing that the independence of the 
ECB cannot mean independence in defining—or setting—its own mandate.
148
 What it does 
mean, however, is independence in exercising economic judgment within its mandate. If, 
                                            
146 See id. at paras. 92–94. 
147 See supra Part D.II.1. 
148 See OMT Ruling at para. 60; Case C-11/00 Commission v. ECB [2003] ECR I-7147. 
2014] Law Meets Economics 319 
             
as we argue, an OMT Programme intended to provide a firewall against bad equilibria, and 
thus to rectify or prevent market failures, falls within the ECB’s mandate, and if this is the 
course of action the ECB is most likely to take, an argument can be made that only 
manifest proof for a misjudgment of the situation on the part of the ECB, or for the 
prevalence of other, extra-mandate motivations should trigger court review before the ECB 
acts. Absent this, the OMT Decision should at the very least be regarded as also covering 
possible implementations that are in line with the ECB’s mandate and are properly 
described as monetary policy or, alternatively, as permissible support of the economic 
policies in the Union. In addition, if exercised as discussed above, the OMT Programme also 
does not constitute monetary financing of the Member States’ budgets. 
 
One may disagree with this point, and demand a clearer limitation of any such wide-
ranging policy announcement ex ante in order to avoid “irreparable harm”. While we do 
not think this to be a practicable solution,
149
 we certainly do not think that courts will often 
be in a position to identify the only legal way in which existing discretion can in theory be 
used. What the Constitutional Court has done in its ruling, however, is exactly that. 
 
Where does this leave us? Coming back to our considerations from Part B above, if we 
assume that the ECJ rules that OMT falls within the mandate of the ECB and does not 
violate Article 123 TFEU, the Constitutional Court has essentially two possible courses of 
action. We would not expect the interpretation of the Court of Justice to be in line with the 
one considered to be unobjectionable by the Constitutional Court in its OMT Decision.
150
 
Neither would that be desirable, since, as argued, it would render the OMT Decision 
meaningless.  
 
The Constitutional Court will take the interpretation given by the Court of Justice as a basis 
for its further examination of the constitutionality of the challenged act.
151
 It can then 
either decide that the relevant provisions of EU law, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, 
go beyond the powers conferred on the Union and that all acts based on the provisions 
are, consequently, ultra vires, or it can accept the interpretation given by Court of Justice 
but hold that the provision of EU law is in conflict with the constitutional identity of 
Germany. In the latter case, however, the Constitutional Court’s reasoning could face the 
objection that the challenged acts fall within the mandate of the ECB as determined in the 
Treaty of Maastricht, and that this Treaty was held to be in conformity with the German 
                                            
149 In a way this would be akin to a “presumption of illegality”: whenever an EU law instrument gives discretion to 
an institution or an official, this discretion could in theory be used in an illegal way. It would hardly be practicable 
to have the Court—whether national or European—limit the discretion before it is exercised in order to ensure 
legality. Were that possible, competent legislators would rarely decide that vesting discretion is necessary in the 
first place. 
150 See OMT Ruling at para. 100. 
151 Id. at para. 27. 
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constitution in the Constitutional Court’s Maastricht decision.
152
 Such an objection would 
be based on the premise that it is impossible to interpret the Treaty as intending to 
establish a monetary union in which the central bank cannot rectify market failures, and 
avert bank run-like, self-fulfilling crises, without violating the boundaries of its mandate. In 
its Maastricht decision, the Constitutional Court has held that the Treaty laid down “the 
future course of implementation, that is to say, the possible uses to be made of the 
sovereign powers granted, in a manner which is sufficiently predictable.”
153
 It can be 
argued that the necessity to have a central bank with a mandate broad enough to cover an 
OMT Programme providing an effective backstop in a monetary union was already clear at 
the time of adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, and that the ECB’s corresponding behavior 
during the financial crisis was, accordingly, covered by the Constitutional Court’s formula 
of “sufficient predictability.” 
 
The easiest way out of what we have called the German Catch-22 may be a re-calibrated 
understanding of what the OMT Decision is intended to achieve along the lines suggested 
in this article. This would avoid both a contested interpretation of the Treaty and a 
situation that pits principles underlying Germany’s constitutional identity against Union 
law. 
 
                                            
152 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, 2159/92, 89 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 155 (Oct. 12 1993), 
http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Gericht=BVerfG&Datum=12.10.1993&Aktenzeichen=2%20
BvR%202134/92.  
153 Id. at para. 92. 
